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5This paper was published in Philosophy of Language: An International 
Handbook of Contemporary Research, Volume 2, edited by Marcelo Dascal, 
Dietfried Gerhardus, Kuno Lorenz, and Georg Meggle. Published in Berlin and 
New York by Walter de Gruyter, 1996. It is reprinted here with slight 
revisions. . Introduction 
he terms vagueness, indefiniteness, unspecificity, ambiguity, and 
elated terms like equivocation, hominy, and polysemy have been used 
n various senses to distinguish kinds of indeterminacy in ordinary 
iscourse. Such notions of indeterminacy are sometimes constructed as 
ragmatic concepts, sometimes as semantic ones. These terms are 
hemselves used in different ways. In this articles we distinguish 
ragmatic/semantic roughly as Charles Morris and Rudolf Carnap did: 
ragmatic refers to concepts and studies abstracting from actual use, 
aking language as a system of relations between expressions and 
eanings. Commonly, an expression is said to be ambiguous in so far 
s it can be interpreted in several different ways, can be taken in several 
ifferent senses; but it is said to be vague, given a definite sense of the 
erm. An expression is said to be vague to the extent that there may 
rise doubts about its applicability in particular cases. There are 
ecognized borderline cases where there is no right answer to the 
uestion whether the expression or negation is applicable. For example, 
ald is a vague word; we cannot draw one definite sharp borderline 
etween baldness and non-baldness. There will be a large fringe of 
orderline cases where we cannot say definitely whether the person is 
bald” or “non-bald.” The word bald is not, in this case, ambiguous. It 
as a certain sense; but used in this sense we cannot draw a precise 
imit to its field of true or correct application—its extension. 
agueness, then, is recognized diffused delimitation of the extension of 
n expression; an expression is vague, for a given sense, in so far as the 
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limits of its extension are far from sharp, by virtue of the existence or 
possible existence of a large area of borderline cases.  
 
An ambiguous expression can be vague for one of its senses but not for 
another one. The word function may be an example: used in the 
mathematical sense it is presumably not vague, whereas in non-
mathematical uses it may be comparatively vague. Ambiguity as well as 
vagueness are distinct from the lack of specificity. The statement (T), 
“There is a man at the door,” does not specify characteristics of the 
man, whether he is tall or short, young or old, shabby or well dressed, 
what his nationality is, or his name, etc. The statement fails to specify 
such information, and may be said to be correspondingly unspecific. 
But this is not to say this it is ambiguous. Nor is its lack of specificity 
the same as vagueness. The statement (U), “There is a tall bald man at 
the door,” is more specific than (T), but scarcely less vague. On the 
contrary, it might be said to be more vague, since it has at least a 
borderline case which is not a borderline case for (T); whereas any 
borderline cases for (T) would be one for (U). One borderline case for 
(U) but not for (Y) would be a situation where we would be uncertain 
whether to describe a man at the door as bald or non-bald. Discourse is 
sometimes described as “unclear,” “indefinite,” “vague,” etc., where 
these expressions do not refer to diffuseness of limitations of extensions 
of expressions, but rather to the lack of intelligibility of the discourse, 
or the superficiality or wanting perspicuity of the thoughts expressed in 
it. From empirical studies of use, intuitions about acceptable and 
unacceptable expressions, and rules of use announced by users of a 
language, consistent systems of rules of use announced by users of a 
language, consistent systems of rules are formulated, for example, 
grammars. If a system gains authority, usage violating that system is 
called incorrect. But persistent ‘violation’ among broad or influential 
groups of people motivate changes of the system or adoption of a new 
one as authoritative. Then the judgments of incorrectness change 
accordingly. This affects what is said to be ambiguous. Systems are 
always fragmentary in relation to the richness of variations of usage. 
Therefore what is said to be ambiguous in relation to a proposed system 
may not be ambiguous in (actual) use, and vice versa. 
 
2. Ambiguity 
2.1. Ambiguity, pragmatics, and semantics 
Ambiguity is sometimes defined as the actual use of an expression to 
express several different meanings, or else as the possibility for an 
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expression to be used or understood in several different ways. When 
meaning variance in actual use in definite context is stressed, ambiguity 
is constructed as a pragmatic concept rather than a semantic one.1 In 
other cases, ambiguity is constructed as a semantic notion, so that a 
syntactical unit (a morpheme, word, sequence, sentence, etc.), regarded 
as part of a linguistic system in abstraction from use, can be said to be 
ambiguous. The semantic property of ambiguity of an expression may 
be taken to explain the actual occurrence of different ways of using or 
understanding the expression. For example, the semantic ambiguity of 
the word refuse may be supposed to contribute to explaining why the 
text “Garbage service. We accept bottles and refuse paper” may be 
understood in two different ways. Ambiguity is sometimes defined in a 
way that presupposed a concept of sense (in the Fregean way) as 
distinct from extension.2 Ambiguity consists in one expression’s having 
several different senses or being interpretable as expressing several 
different senses. Arne Naess3 developed a theory of ambiguity and 
interpretation as pragmatic concepts, a theory that does not presuppose 
a concept of ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ but only concepts of ‘synonymity’ 
(meaning the same as) and ‘non-synonymity’, with subtitutability in 
actual use as a criterion of synonmity.4 A given pair of expressions may 
be synonymous in some situations but not in others, and for some 
persons but not all, being substitutable in some cases but not all cases. 
In terms of the concepts of synonymity and non-synonymity, concepts 
of ambiguity, interpretation, and preciseness (in Naess’s sense) may be 
defined. Roughly, we may say that an expression (as a type) is 
ambiguous if and only if it has non-synonymous instances (tokens); one 
expression is an interpretation of another one if and only if both are 
(would be) synonymous for many persons in many (types of) situations; 
hence, a plausible interpretation of a sentence may be said to indicate a 
frequent use of it. Finally, one expression is a precision of (more 
precise than) another if and only if the set of plausible interpretations of 
the former is a proper subset of the plausible interpretations of the 
latter. Hence, a precision of a sentence may be said to eliminate some of 
its ambiguities in ordinary usage without adding any new ones. Thus 
we may note that “more precise than,” as here defined, means “less 
ambiguous than.” This should be distinguished from the use of “more 
precise than” to mean “less vague than,” a notion discussed below. 
 
Levels of ambiguity 
In the following, we shall distinguish between semantic and pragmatic 
levels of ambiguity, in the sense of the possibility of understanding an 
expression or utterance in several different ways, each compatible with 
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the rules of language. Ambiguity of an expression, on the semantic 
level, is construed as being rooted in the lexical or syntactical rules of 
the language: different, prima facie equally applicable rules attribute 
different meanings to the expression.  
 
2.2.1. Lexical ambiguity is ambiguity of single words: a word may 
express different meanings in different contexts, for example, in 
different sentences and in different situations. For example, consider the 
word “cape” in the sentences: “The ship passed the cape,” and “Mrs. 
McKinsey wore a cape.” In lexical ambiguity, the same sound (word) is 
associated with several different lexical or semantic, rules, so that it 
may mean different things in different contexts or situations. 
 
Constraints on ambiguity may be imposed by a context. The systematic 
or lexical ambiguity of a word considered in isolation may be 
eliminated when the word is used in a sentence, as in the above 
examples. One meaning of the word makes the sentence intelligible as a 
whole whereas others do not, or can be made to do so only with an 
effort of the imagination. In the sentence “Mrs. McKinsey wore a 
cape,” the sense “promontory” of the word “cape” would hardly 
contribute to an intelligible sentence meaning. We may suppose that the 
sentence, as a context for the word, imposes constraints on the 
interpretation of the word so as to exclude some, perhaps all but one, of 
its possible senses. Some of these constraints may have to do with the 
intelligibility or probability of the state of affairs described by the 
sentence. 
 
Amphiboly and structural ambiguity 
Since Aristotle,5 “amphiboly” (άµφβολία) has often been used to denote 
ambiguity of whole sentences.6 An example borrowed from Aristotle: 
“I wish that you the enemy may capture.” Another example: “The 
peasants are revolting.” Ambiguity of a sentence may be due to a 
residue of lexical ambiguities of one or more of the words in the 
sentence, as in “The bank was the scene of the crime,” or to the 
possibility of grouping the words together in different ways, that is, 
structural ambiguity. Examples: “The far major’s wife was fond of 
macaroni.” “I heard about him at school.” “The shooting of the hunters 
was terrible.” “He had two adult sons and one daughter in a nunnery.” 
An important form of structural ambiguity is ambiguous cross 
reference, when an expression, for example a pronoun, refers to 
something mentioned before, but the context does not make clear which 
of several possible referents is intended. An example: “When Napoleon 
ordered Marechal Ney to attack, he was very angry.” The prophecies of 
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ancient oracles were often structurally ambiguous, in such ways that the 
prophecy might be claimed to be true regardless of what turned out to 
happen. For example, a reply of an oracle was “Pyrrhus the Romans 
shall, I say, subdue.” 
 
2.2.4. Ambiguity, surface structure, and deep structure 
The new paradigm of generative grammar that replaced taxonomic 
structuralism in linguistics conceives of grammatical analysis as the 
construction and testing of theories about the speaker’s internalized 
linguistic competence.7 According to Noam Chomsky, a grammatical 
theory should throw light on such facts as: we can understand new 
sentences, we can distinguish grammatical and ungrammatical 
sentences even when we have never heard them before, and we have 
acquired a great number of intuitions about linguistic form. The fact 
that we can understand ambiguous sentences, recognize the ambiguities 
and disambiguate such sentences, is among the facts to be accounted for 
by linguistic theory. The need to account for syntactic ambiguity and 
competent speakers’ ability to disambiguate such sentences is among 
the facts to be accounted for by linguistic theory. The need to account 
for syntactic ambiguity and competent speakers’ ability to disambiguate 
such ambiguity was emphasized. However, on the level of syntax there 
seem to be two types of ambiguity, a more superficial one and an 
underlying one. The existence of the latter, presumably exemplified by 
“The shooting of the hunters was terrible.” led to the assumption of a 
deep structure level that grammars should account for. Chomsky’s 
analysis seems implicitly to take account of ambiguities at three distinct 
linguistic levels (lexical, surface structure, and deep structure 
ambiguities). Deep structure ambiguities depend to a greater extent on 
underlying logical relationships between items in the sentence. Such 
ambiguities depend to a greater extent on underlying logical 
relationships between items in the sentence, as is supposedly the case 
with “Visiting relatives can be a nuisance.” Thus, ambiguity has been 
an important consideration in the development of modern generative 
grammatical theory. Adequate specification of the readings for 
ambiguous sentences was taken as a condition for the construction of 
wellformed grammars.8  
 
2.2.5. Pragmatic ambiguity 
Semantically or syntactically ambiguous sentences may often be 
disambiguated by taking into account greater units of verbal context or 
non-verbal circumstances of situations of use. We may suppose that 
when pragmatic circumstances, such as users and wider contexts and 
situations of use are considered, more severe constraints are imposed on 
the interpretation so as to exclude some, perhaps all but one, or maybe 
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even all, possible consistent or understandable meanings of the sentence 
or passage. But, an utterance or expression may remain ambiguous even 
when such pragmatic factors are taken account of. We may call this 
ambiguity on the pragmatic level. A string of words, e.g., a sentence or 
passage, used by someone in some situation, may be interpreted in 
several different ways, because the meaning is undetermined by 
linguistic (lexical and structural) rules and context or situation of use. 
For example, a passage in Spinoza’a Ethica may be undetermined, even 
if the rules of Latin and the whole verbal context and situation of use 
are taken into account, including general knowledge of Spinoza’s life 
and philosophy; several different interpretations may be equally 
plausible.  
 
Different Spinoza-experts may defend different interpretations of the 
text, and no objective factor is found that would impose a further 
constraint so as to eliminate one of the contending interpretations. More 
trivial examples of pragmatically ambiguous expressions occur in 
newspaper articles, political speeches, etc. Consider, e.g., the sentence 
“Private initiative must be introduced into health care,” occurring in a 
short newspaper review of a political debate which gives no further 
clues as to how the sentence is to be interpreted. In the case of 
pragmatic ambiguity, we may distinguish between ambiguity with 
respect to the illocutionary force of an utterance, and ambiguity with 
regard to its context or meaning.9 But in the case of the latter, we may 
also distinguish between ambiguity with respect to what the speaker 
wishes to express explicitly and ambiguity with respect to what 
transpires from the utterance by virtue of innuendo, pragmatic 
implicature, etc.10 A leading idea of the preceding paragraphs is that the 
range of possible meanings of expressions or strings of expressions is 
narrowed down by constraints imposed by linguistic (lexical and 
structural) rules, pragmatic conventions, e.g., dialogue conventions, 
verbal contexts and situations of use, and perhaps considering of 
intelligibility or probability of (described) situations. Such constraints 
may narrow the field of possible meanings down to one, for a wide set 
of interpreters. Ambiguity on any level, lexical, structural or pragmatic, 
may be construed as under determination of meaning by constraints 
imposed at (up to and including) that level: two or more different 
meaning-options are left open. 
 
The ubiquity of ambiguity 
How pervasive is ambiguity? The question itself is highly ambiguous. 
One answer would be: It depends on the list of possible meanings to 
which we refer. If the list is short and crude we may find a sentence 
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unambiguous, for instance, the sentence “The Earth is surrounded by a 
field of gravitation.” But if we go into precisions of the word 
“gravitation” the sentence may be said to permit different 
interpretations. When we construe an expression as a part of a language 
in the sense of a linguistic system, we may be said to permit different 
interpretations. When we construe an expression as a part of a 
language in the sense of a linguistic system, we may be inclined to 
conceive of the expression as having one and only one definite sense, 
unless it is associated with several different meaning-rules in the 
system, like “bank” or “band” or “cape,” or alternative structural rules. 
In the case of such expressions, we may be inclined to say that the 
system in question is such that the words or sentences are ambiguous.  
 
But ‘language’ may be construed as a kind of idealized abstraction from 
actual instances of use involving many kinds of variations of use, as 
done in the quotation: “A grammar of language purports to be a 
description of the ideal speaker-hearer’s intrinsic competence.”11 When 
we think about ‘Language’ or ‘Grammar’ we may disregard many kinds 
of variations of use. Such factors as we then overlook, may be the ones 
we have to take into account when we try to understand or interpret 
particular utterances or texts. In the linguistic community what is talked 
of as correct shows socially and politically interesting relations to class 
and social hierarchical relationships in general. The idea of correctness 
as a tool of domination has been extensively studied.12  
 
But in daily life we are normally more interested in what someone may 
actually have sought to express, or how some group of persons actually 
understand an utterance or text, than in finding out what is ‘correct or 
incorrect use of language’, or what characterizes ‘the ideal speaker-
hearer’s intrinsic competence’. Normally, we try to clarify disturbing 
ambiguities and vagueness, and we succeed. The utility of expressions 
is due to their having ‘dictionary’ as well as ‘contextual’ sense (that can 
vary in different situations); words must be recognizable to any person 
with linguistic competence, but each user seeks to express the particular 
nuance of meaning that fits into the context where he uses the word. 
That linguistic expressions can be used in many varying ways, 
according to situations and needs, has been called the “efficiency of 
language.”13 Ambiguity, according to Jon Barwise and John Perry,14 is 
simply a species of efficiency of language. But when language is used 
in particular cases, there may arise insecurity and misunderstandings 
with respect to contextual meanings; and they cannot be eliminated 
simply by appealing to ‘language’ or ‘correct usage’. We may say, in 
short, that utterances and texts are often ambiguous in the sense that 
pragmatic ambiguity is present. However, ambiguous sentences are not 
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necessarily perceived to be so. When ambiguities are obvious, this is 
often a source of humour as in puns. Unnoticed ambiguities, on the 
other hand, may be sources of fallacies in reasoning, and of spurious 
agreement or disagreement in discussion. 
 
Fallacies due to ambiguity 
Aristotle in De sophisticis elenchis distinguished between fallacies 
dependent on language and fallacies ‘outside language’. The former 
kind are fallacies arising from ambiguity. The simplest of these are 
fallacies of equivocation, fallacies due to lexical ambiguity. Fallacies of 
amphiboly are fallacies arising from double-meaning of sentences. One 
version of the so-called ‘four term fallacy ‘ is a fallacy of equivocation 
of the middle term in a syllogism, violating the rule that every 
syllogism has three, and only three, terms. An example given by the late 
Sydney Herbert Mellone: “All metals are elements. Brass is a metal. 
Therefore, brass is an element.” Mellone comments15 that here, the 
middle term, “metal” is used in two different senses, in one case about 
pure metals (which are elements), in the other, about pure metals or 
alloys. Clearly, this is a case of fallacy of equivocation; but such 
fallacies of equivocation of the middle term are often classified as cases 
of the four term fallacy. A possible justification for this might be the 
claim that if a term is used ambiguously, it is really two terms. But such 
a theory of ambiguity seems dubious since it would appear to have the 
consequence that there are really no ambiguous expressions, but more 
or less unsurveyable multitudes of like-sounding and similar-looking 
unambiguous expressions. A more acceptable justification might 
perhaps be that in a syllogism with ambiguous middle term, actually 
four rather than three concepts are involved. Charles Leonard Hamblin, 
however, criticizes the common classification of fallacy equivocation of 
the middle term as the (formal) four term fallacy. 
 
The middle term cannot be equivocal unless it is one term with two meanings. If 
there are really four terms we have a formal fallacy, independently of whether any 
term is equivocal; if we have an essentially equivocal term there is a fallacy of the 
Aristotelian variety /depending on language/ whatever the formal shape of the 
argument. 16
 
Fallacies may occur in ethical argumentation because key words used in 
such arguments may be ambiguous as between normative and 
descriptive senses. A famous example is found in John Stuart Mill’s 
argument17 for the conclusion that “happiness is desirable, and the only 
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thing desirable, as an end,”18 where he shifts between a descriptive and 
a normative sense of “desirable.” 
 
Pseudo-agreement and –disagreement 
Ambiguities may give rise to pseudo-agreement or—disagreement, 
verbal agreement or disagreement that does not correspond to 
agreement or disagreement in fact. This kind of misunderstanding may 
be quite common: in any case a large part of daily personal discourse as 
well as political discussion is conducted without sufficient guarantee 
that the participants really are in accord or discord on what they believe 
they agree or disagree about. An example of a dialogue that shows 
symptoms of pseudo-disagreement at a certain stage: (1) A: “A welfare 
society cannot exist without socialism.” (2) B: “I disagree. A number of 
European countries have been welfare societies even under non-
socialist governments.” (3) A: “I did not mean that. I meant that a 
welfare society cannot be developed in a country unless a social 
ideology has a strong influence in that country.” (4) B: “Oh, I see. Well, 
if that was what you meant, I agree.” At stage (2) in the dialogue, B 
declares his disagreement with A’s remark (1), i.e., there is ‘verbal 
disagreement ‘. But at stage (3), A rejects the interpretation of (1) on 
which B based his disagreement; and restates his opinion, presumably 
in a more unambiguous way, i.e., ‘more precise’, in Naess’ sense.19 In 
(4), B expresses his agreement with what he takes A to mean in (3). 
Levels (3) and (4), then, suggest that the disagreement in (2) was 
merely verbal and not real; hence a pseudo-disagreement. However, it 
is to be noted that if the dialogue continues, it may very well at later 
stages show symptoms that the agreement at level (4) was merely 
verbal and not real, hence a pseudo-agreement. Hence, any such 
judgment about real/pseudo agreement/disagreement must be 
provisional and tentative.20 Dagfinn Føllesdal21 suggests that Willard 
Van Orman Quine’s rejection of the distinctions analytic/synthetic and 
meaning/belief may inspire doubts about the tenability of the distinction 
between verbal and real agreement/disagreement.22
 
Ambiguity as fault or virtue 
Vagueness, unspecificity, and indefiniteness are sometimes regarded as 
relatively harmless or, in the case of vagueness, unavoidable aspects of 
ordinary language and discourse. Ambiguity, on the other hand, is often 
described as undesirable and harmful but remediable; this is a tradition 
that goes back to antiquity. Marcus Tullius Cicero was concerned with 
the fact that misunderstandings due to ambiguity may be utilized in 
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dishonest ploys of persuasion. Use of ambiguous words should be 
avoided, or one ought to display their different meanings. A number of 
other philosophers and logicians in antiquity and medieval times regard 
ambiguity as harmful.23 After the Renaissance, this tradition has 
continued. For example, Pertus Ramus24 wrote that “the fault of 
ambiguity . . .  is a common fault of all speech.” Blaise Pascal criticized 
the dishonest use of ambiguous expressions where one pretends to use 
them in a sense that is different from the meaning that one actually 
intends. Similar views have been expressed by more recent semanticists 
and philosophers of language. Some, for example, Herman Tennessen, 
have pointed out that in debates one may sometimes hear a participant 
alternating between different interpretations of one of his statements, on 
the one hand interpretations which make it safe (but quite trivial and 
uninteresting), on the other hand interpretations which make the 
statement interesting and consequential (but uncertain or doubtful). In 
order to emphasize the importance of the statement, or draw 
consequences from it, the speaker takes recourse to the more daring 
interpretations. In this way, the speaker can create the impression that 
his statement is interesting as well as tenable.  
 
An example from a discussion between politicians about possible 
savings in the public health services: The politician A states: “It should 
be permitted to reduce the offer of therapy to patients with chronic 
mental illness, since (t) this group cannot be cured anyway.” The 
expression “patients with chronic mental illness” is ambiguous; it may 
mean either ‘patients with incurable mental illness’ or ‘patients of 
mental illness with long duration’. The former interpretation makes (T) 
synonymous with (U) “the group of patients with incurable mental 
illness cannot be cured anyway,” and hence trivial (or analytic, if one 
accepts the notion of analyticity). The other interpretation makes (T) 
synonymous with (V) “the group of patients with mental illness of long 
duration cannot be cured anyway.” (V) is not trivial or analytic, but will 
be quite controversial and is quite likely false. In his speech, A draws a 
conclusion from (T) (“It should be permitted to reduce the offer of 
therapy to patients with chronic mental illness”) and draws the further 
conclusion that considerable amounts can be saved on the health-budget 
by reducing the offer of therapy to the whole group of patients with 
mental illness of long duration. Here, he applies the non-trivial 
interpretation of (T). But when A is attacked by the politician B who 
says that A’s view is unreasonable and unacceptable in a modern 
welfare society, A defends himself by claiming that by “patients with 
chronic mental illness” he merely meant ‘patients with incurable mental 
illness’, and the offer of therapy must obviously be wasted on incurable 
patients. In spite of the possibility of abuse and harmfulness of 
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ambiguity, some contemporary authors, however, emphasize that 
ambiguity is simply an aspect of the general ‘efficiency’ of language, 
the fact that linguistic expressions can serve many different purposes in 
different contexts and situations, and that is precisely this ‘efficiency’ 
that makes language so immensely useful.25 Ambiguity may be 
harmful, but it is not necessarily so under all circumstances. In poetry, 
multiple meanings of words may be an asset, they make for greater 
richness of associations.26
 
Intolerance of ambiguity 
It has been suggested that linguistic ambiguity is related to ambiguity in 
a very wide sense, for instance emotional ambivalence, and reversibility 
in visual perception of figures like reversibility in visual perception of 
figures like the duck-rabbit, the Necker cube, the Peter-Paul goblet, etc. 
It has been claimed that general mental rigidity (low ability to 
restructure the cognitive-perceptual field) is related to low ability to 
deal with emotional ambivalence as well as low ability to recognize and 
discriminate between different meanings of ambiguous linguistic 
expressions. Psycholinguistic research has shown individual differences 
in the ability to detect and resolve ambiguity.27 The notion of a 
connection between mental rigidity, low tolerance of ambivalence, and 
low ability to handle ambiguity led to the assumption, in social 
psychology, of general ‘intolerance of ambiguity’ as a character trait of 
‘authoritarian’ persons.28
 
Vagueness 
Vagueness is commonly defined in terms of the existence or possible 
existence of borderline cases, and a borderline case for an expression P 
is an object or state of affairs x such that the affirmation as well as the 
denial of P in relation to x is essentially doubtful. The notion of 
essential doubtfulness is distinguished from uncertainty due to lack of 
knowledge of facts. A distinction is sometimes drawn between 
extensional and intentional vagueness. An expression is extensionally 
vague if it has some actually existing borderline case; but it is 
intentionally vague if it is logically possible that it could have some 
borderline case. 
 
Vagueness as a pragmatic notion 
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Charles Sanders Peirce29 defined “vague” as “indeterminate in 
intention,”30 and thus seems to differ from those who construe 
vagueness as indeterminateness of extension. On one interpretation, 
Peirce characterizes what has sometimes been called indefiniteness of 
intention31 or low depth of intended meaning.32 Peirce says that  
 
a proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning 
which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the 
speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the 
proposition. By intrinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain in consequence 
of any ignorance of the interpreter, but because the speaker’s habits of 
language were indeterminate; so that one day he would regard the 
proposition as excluding, another as admitting, those states of things. Yet this 
must be understood to have reference to what might be deduced from a 
perfect knowledge of his state of mind; for it is precisely because these 
questions never did, or did not frequently, present themselves that his habits 
remained indeterminate.33  
 
Vagueness in this sense would be a pragmatic concept. Carl Gustav 
Hempel also construed vagueness as a pragmatic concept. 
 
. . . the vagueness of a symbol consists in the existence of a speaking habit 
among the users which involves the occurrence of . . . variations in the 
application of the symbol . . .34  Vagueness is strictly semiotic: there is no 
analogue to it on the purely syntactico-semantical level . . .35
 
Hempel’s motivation for this view has to do with problems associated 
with applying logic to vague expressions—problems suggested, for 
example, by Bertrand Russell. 
 
Russell on Vagueness 
Russell, however, defined vagueness as a semantic concept. Russell 
opposed “vagueness” to “precision.” According to him, there are 
“characteristics which can belong only to a representation, of which 
language is an example. They have to do with the relation between a 
representation and that which it represents.”36
 
According to Russell, 
 
a representation is vague when the relation of the representing system to the 
represented system is not one-one, but one-many. For example, a photograph 
which is so smudged that it might equally represent Brown or Jones or 
Robinson is vague.37
 
As Bertil Rolf remarks,38 one problem with Russell’s definition is that it 
seems to equate vagueness with generality. Further, as Rolf points out,39 
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it is doubtful, whether Russell’s semantic framework contains the 
means necessary for effecting a distinction between vagueness and 
ambiguity. A third problem for Russell’s definition is that vagueness as 
ordinarily conceived is intimately connected with the existence of 
borderline cases as a criterion of vagueness,40 but his definition makes 
no mention of this.41
 
Vagueness and logic 
If, as Russell claims, all language is vague, and if standard logic applies 
only to nonvague expressions, it is inappropriate to actual discourse and 
reasoning. Nevertheless standard logic seems applicable in many cases 
where we use vague expressions. But the problem of reconciling the 
requirements of standard logic with the vagueness of ordinary 
expressions or concepts has engaged many logicians and philosophers, 
and many have either denied or seriously doubted that the two are 
reconcilable, e.g., Gottlob Frege,42 Peirce, Russell, Alfred Jules Ayer,43 
Peter T. Geach.44 Peirce wrote that the vague “might be defined as that 
to which the principle of contradiction does not apply.”45 Others have 
doubted or denied the applicability of the principle of excluded middle 
to vague concepts. 
 
Tertium non datur? 
Frege46 pointed out that the law of excluded middle is merely another 
version of the requirement that the concept (in extension) be sharply 
delimited, i.e., not vague. According to Frege, a concept-word stands 
for a concept if and only if it clearly determined an extension: for any 
object, a corresponding truth value for the word is determined with no 
uncertainty, hence there are no borderline cases. Clearly, Frege wanted 
to restrict the use of the expression “concept-word” to nonvague terms 
since vague terms would seem to violate the requirements of logic. It is 
therefore not surprising that Russell held that vagueness causes 
problems for the law of excluded middle.  
 
“The law of excluded middle is true when precise symbols are 
employed, but it is not true when symbols are vague, as, in fact, all 
symbols are.”47  
 
Since traditional logic presupposes the truth of the law of excluded 
middle, traditional does not apply to our language.48 Max Black and 
Hempel, in their papers on vagueness, tried in various ways to 
overcome what Black called Russell’s “sacrifice of logic.” Black tried 
to establish a logic taking account of the vagueness of symbols, with 
classic logic as a limiting case for nonvague symbols. Hempel tried to 
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drive a wedge between vagueness and logic by constructing vagueness 
as a pragmatic notion that cannot be incorporated into a syntactic-
semantic system, where logic belongs.49 William P. Alston50 suggests 
that the problem of vagueness can be handled by rejecting the law, by 
denying that in a case where truth or falsity cannot be pronounced we 
have a statement, or by taking the law to apply only to an ‘ideal’ 
language. 
 
3.3.2 σωρίης and φαλακρός 
A number of paradoxes have been known by these names since 
antiquity. Diogenes Laertius ascribes51 them to Eubuildes of the 
Megarian school, a contemporary of Aristotle. The σωρίης, or ‘heap’, is 
the argument that there can be no such thing as a heap of sand since one 
grain is not a heap and adding one grain to something that is not a heap 
is never sufficient to turn it into a heap. The φαλακρός or ‘bald head’ is 
a similar demonstration that no one can have a head full of hair. Such 
paradoxes can be generated by any process of gradual change 
associated with dichotomy (e.g., “heap/non-heap”). The problem with 
such a paradox is that we seem to have good reasons for accepting the 
premises as true and rejecting the conclusion as false; nevertheless, the 
argument seems valid. In recent discussions, various solutions to this 
quandary have been proposed in fuzzy logic, theories of 
supervaluations and proposals for metalanguages which take all 
positive ascriptions of vague predicates to be false.52
 
Supervaluation 
People’s actual beliefs are in many cases neither simply true nor simply 
false. In such cases, we have two possibilities. We may either regard 
them as entirely without a truth value, or we may ascribe unusual truth 
values to them when they do not have the usual truth or falsehood as 
values. In theories of supervaluation, the former alternative is 
developed; in fuzzy logic, the latter. Theories of supervaluation have 
been proposed, e.g., by Kit Fine,53 Hans Kamp,54 and Marian 
Przelęcki.55 Roughly, the idea in the supervaluation approach is that a 
vague belief’s or proposition’s truth is its supervaluation, which is a 
function of the proposition’s tentative ordinary (classical) truth 
valuations. A tentative valuation is the ordinary truth value the 
proposition would have if it were made precise ( = nonvague) in some 
particular way, so as to rule out all borderline cases. For each way of 
making the proposition precise, we get a new tentative classical 
valuation for that proposition, indicating whether the proposition, as 
thus made precise, is true or false. If every way of making the 
proposition precise makes it (classically) true, all of its tentative 
valuations will be true. If every precise version of the proposition is 
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false, all of the tentative classical valuations are false. Otherwise, we 
get a mixture of tentative valuations. The supervaluation of the vague 
proposition is truth if and only if all the tentative valuations are true; 
falsity if and only if they are all false; and undefined otherwise. On the 
theory of supervaluations, one of the premises of the version of Sorites 
mentioned above is false: “Adding one grain to something that is not a 
heap is never sufficient to turn it into a heap.” This is false, since the 
following would be true for each way of making it precise: “There are 
cases such that adding one grain of sand to something that was not a 
heap of sand before, would be sufficient to turn it into a heap.” One 
presumed advantage of the supervaluation approach is that the theorems 
of classical logic remain logically true on this interpretation, since the 
theorems will always be true on every tentative classical valuation. 
Kenton F. Machina56 questions this supposed advantage. He claims that 
although the supervaluation approach preserves all the classical 
tautologies, it does not preserve all the classical rules of inference. He 
suggests that the supervaluation approach runs afoul of what seem to be 
reasonable requirements on what can count as valid inferences. 
 
Fuzzy Logic 
The basic ideas of fuzzy logic apparently stem from Black’s paper57 on 
vagueness. In fuzzy logic, in cases where vague propositions are neither 
true nor false, they are assumed to take on ‘unusual truth values’ 
thought of as degrees of truth and falsehood. This approach has been 
advocated, e.g., by Lotfi Asker Zadeh, Joseph Amadee Goguen and 
Machina. The assumption is that there are infinitely many truth values 
which are generally represented by the unit interval from 0 to 1; where 
0 represents complete falsity and 1 complete truth. Machina claims that 
Jan Łukasiewicz’ system, Łx is well suited to serve as a logic of 
vagueness. A qualification theory and a set-theoretic semantics is 
provided by means of a generalized set theory described by Zadeh and 
developed by Goguen. This set theory differs from ordinary set theory 
by allowing the set membership to admit of degrees, providing so-
called “fuzzy sets.” To each predicate letter in the calculus, a fuzzy set 
is assigned as its extension, so that some members of the domain of 
interpretation are ‘in’ the extension of a given predicate letter only to a 
limited extent. Fuzzy logic claims to solve the sorites paradox by 
denying that the sorites argument is completely valid. Each step of the 
argument is slightly invalid, so the truth guaranteed slowly leaks away 
as we try to carry it along the chain. But fuzzy logic also claims to 
explain the deceptiveness of the sorites argument. Rolf58 claims that the 
theory of truth presented by fuzzy logic is seriously deficient.  
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Variability of application and borderline cases 
Max Black took over from Peirce the idea that ‘borderline case’ for an 
expression is definable in terms of variation concerning the application 
(extension) of the expression. This idea recurs in many definitions of 
vagueness. Rolf59 argues against this that individual variations in 
applications of an expression are neither sufficient nor necessary for 
establishing borderline cases and vagueness of this expression.60 A 
borderline case for an expression T is not one where approximately half 
of the speakers of the language in question affirm the expression and 
the rest deny it; rather a borderline case for T is one where neither 
affirming nor denying T can be said to be ‘correct’ and where 
affirmation as well as denial of T would convey information that was 
misleading because too definite. The application of T as well as -T is 
‘essentially doubtful’ or arbitrary. 
 
3.5 Vagueness and Ignorance 
As suggested (in 3.), this ‘essential doubtfulness’ of the applicability of 
a vague expression is supposedly a distinct form of uncertainty due to 
lack of knowledge of facts. On the traditional concept, vagueness is 
taken as a semantic property of expressions that is independent of the 
speaker’s ignorance of facts. The indeterminacy is due to an aspect of 
the meaning of the term rather than to the current state of our 
knowledge.61 Quine’s skepticism about a distinction between matters of 
meaning and matters of fact might inspire doubts about the traditional 
concept of vagueness. Such doubts are voiced by Israeal Scheffler.62
 
Intolerance of Vagueness 
It might be surmised that vagueness, like ambiguity, may be connected 
with broader psychological and emotional phenomena. Actually ‘black-
white thinking’ suggested as a trait of the ‘authoritarian personality,’63 
might be regarded as a manifestation of a generalized intolerance of 
vagueness, the need for a yes-or-no answer on any issue, the dread of 
intermediate ‘grey zones’ or uncertainty or undecidability, and the 
hostility towards any inclination to withhold judgment. This 
‘generalized intolerance of vagueness’ may be related to the 
incapability of admitting intermediate cases such as those expressible in 
modal systems; e.g., the case where something is ‘adiaforon’ in the 
sense of neither obligatory nor prohibited, or where something is 
neither affirmed nor denied, or neither known to be true nor known to 
be false. 
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